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1I. Introduction
In an integrated world, marginal cost differences are the driving force for the
reallocation of production parts (offshoring) and for the make-or-buy-decision
(outsourcing). Especially for western European countries, the wage and labour cost
differences constitute the central explanation for the increasing business practice of
offshoring and international outsourcing to eastern European or Asian countries.1
Reasons for the wage gaps are, among others, differences in labour market institutions
and in the process of wage determination. In most western European countries, wages
are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and trade
unions. In eastern European or Asian countries, however, unions are much weaker so
that wages are determined by market forces. Typically low-skilled workers in western
Europe are unionized so that labour unions have been able to push for their relatively
high wages at the cost of a higher unemployment in continental Europe than in the
United States (see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat (2001)). In opposite to the low skilled,
the wages of skilled workers are mostly determined competitively.2
Since western European firms have the opportunity to buy foreign intermediate
goods after knowing the domestic wage levels and so the marginal production cost, this
will affect the domestic wage formation process for both types of worker. The threat of
flexible outsourcing as a reaction to high domestic marginal production cost will
dampen the opportunity of the trade union to realize a high wage level for the low
skilled. To induce them to abstain from external procurement of intermediate goods,
western European firms need lower marginal cost. Since both, wages for skilled and
unskilled, affect the marginal production cost, there are two components to reduce
1 See Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004), which emphasize the big difference in
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing
and services to countries with low labour costs.
2        There are some papers that analyze the effects of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous, like
Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (2008). However, these papers analyze labour market
frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour unions in the case of unskilled
wage formation.
2marginal cost. If lower wages are not possible, firms have to increase their productivity.
One channel to increase productivity is to stimulate workers’ effort. The firm may
introduce a profit sharing scheme that lets workers participate in the firm’s success. The
implementation of profit sharing will induce incentives to increase effort and thus
productivity for given wage levels. Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an
important phenomenon in many OECD countries. Pendleton et al. (2001) have
presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD countries.3 However
only high skilled workers, such as manager, are often realize profit sharing as a part of
income. So they participate on the firm success, which is positive influenced by their
effort.  But  profit  sharing  will  also  affect  wage  formation  for  low  and  high  skilled
workers. Since a part of the wage income can be substituted by profit income, profit
sharing can probably affect the base wage for the high skilled worker. Although higher
effort of skilled provides higher productivity and thus raises the firms’ profit, which
opens the opportunity for the trade union to pick up a higher share of this profit by
demanding a higher wage for low skilled workers. However, thus dampen the
advantage of domestic production and increase outsourcing activities. As profit sharing
is now commonly incorporated in the compensation schemes and international
outsourcing has recently increased, e.g. in western EU-countries and in the United
States, it is important to study the implications of profit sharing and wage bargaining on
flexible outsourcing in a partly dual labour market.
Concerning the analysis of the effects of outsourcing on compensation schemes
under wage bargaining there are two focuses in the literature, the case of committed and
flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case outsourcing takes place before wage
bargaining4, in the flexible case outsourcing is decided after wage bargaining. Our
3         See also Conyon and Freeman (2001).
4 See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage
bargaining. Also e.g. Danthine and Hunt (1994) and Zhao (1998, 2001) have studied the effects of
international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage formation in the home country.
They showed that higher product market integration implies intensified product market
competition, which moderates wage increases in unionized labour markets. Skaksen and Sorensen
(2001) have studied the effects of trade unions on firms’ foreign direct investments, which are
made prior to the stage of the wage bargaining. Lommerud et al. (2006, 2008) have presented a
theoretical model with monopolistic and oligopolistic competition to determine how unionization
affects the fraction of outsourced inputs.
3focus  in  this  paper  is  to  assume  that  outsourcing  is  flexible,  i.e.  determined
simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but after wage formation for low skilled
worker. To our knowledge, the first one, who studied the effects of flexible outsourcing
on wage setting, is Skaksen (2004).5 Also, Braun and Scheffel (2007b) have developed
a simple two-stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the
labour union sets wages before the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing. But in
these papers they have abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing as a part of the
compensation scheme or heterogeneity of labour force, which is our focus.6 Concerning
the wage effect of profit sharing, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have studied the
differences between committed and flexible profit sharing, but both in the absence of
outsourcing and heterogeneous labour market. An analysis on the interaction of
different profit sharing schemes and outsourcing, in strategic (committed) and flexible
case, is done by Koskela and König (2008a, 2008b). However they focusing also on
homogenous labour force.
We extend their work by allowing for two types of workers7 in dual labour
markets by providing answers to the following question: How does the implementation
of profit sharing for high skilled workers influence outsourcing activities? Since the
firm is flexible to decide about the amount of outsourcing after decisions are made
concerning wage negotiation for the low skilled and profit sharing for the high skilled,
these income parts are influenced by outsourcing costs. By analyzing our main
question, we thus also find answers to: How do the opportunity of flexible outsourcing
and its cost influence the wage for both types of workers and profit sharing? And, what
5      He has analyzed the implications of outsourcing, in terms of both potential (non-realized) and
realized international outsourcing, for wage setting and employment under imperfectly
competitive labour markets.
6 There are also some new analyses, which incorporated flexible outsourcing and wage bargaining,
e.g. Koskela and Poutvaara (2008a), Koskela and Schöb (2008) or Koskela (2008). But the main
focuses in these papers are labour taxation issues in the absence of profit sharing and worker
heterogeneity.
7   Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) analyze strategic outsourcing in a dual labour market in the
presence of wage solidarity by the labour union. Analyzing flexible outsourcing in a dual labour
market is also done by Koskela and Poutvaara (2008b), but there are interested in taxation effects
in the absence of profit sharing. For an introduction into the debate on dual labour markets see
Saint-Paul (1996). His focus is on dual labour market with identical workers by looking on the
dynamic efficiency wage models but there is also a part with heterogeneous workers. However
this research is also in the absence of both outsourcing and profit sharing.
4is the relationship between profit sharing and wage levels? We analyzing these
questions in a partial equilibrium model in which we assume a time sequence of the
profit sharing decision, where firms commit to profit sharing before the base wage
formation.
We find that in this case, the wage of the high skilled will be negatively affected
by the wage of the low skilled. For the effect of implementing committed profit sharing
we show, that it will have a direct effect on the skilled wage, which has a
supplementary character, but a negative indirect effect via the effect on the wage for the
low skilled worker. Thus the overall effect on high skilled wage is ambiguous. We also
show that lower outsourcing cost leads to falling wages for the low skilled. Since the
high skilled wage does not directly depend on outsourcing cost thus the high skilled
wage is only affected indirectly via low skilled wage. Here lower outsourcing cost will
increase  the  high  skilled  wage  and  will  thus  raise  the  wage  dispersion.  Since
outsourcing demand is only affected by the relation of low skilled worker wage and
outsourcing cost, profit sharing will have an enhancing indirect effect on outsourcing
activities.
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of theoretical
framework and two different time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision. Labour
demand, outsourcing and employee effort and skilled wage formation are presented in
Section III. Section IV investigates the low skilled wage formation by monopoly labour
union with committed profit sharing. Finally, we present conclusions in section V.
II. Basic Framework
We analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers, i.e. dual domestic
labour market, flexible international outsourcing and committed profit sharing. The
production combines labour services by effective skilled workers and unskilled
workers. Effective skilled employment is a combination from absolute skilled
employment and the effort by skilled workers, i.e. their productivity. Following
empirical studies, we assume that low skilled workers and outsourcing activities are
5substitute, so that unskilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own
workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. We assume that
the firm may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity after
the wage for low skilled worker is set by the labour union. The analyzed timing
decision is summarized in Figure 1. The timing structure captures the idea that the
representative firm decides profit sharing before the monopoly trade union sets the
unskilled wage.
Figure 1:  time sequences of decision
Flexible outsourcing and committed profit sharing
                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3
time
               profit           unskilled wage            skilled and unskilled labour demand,
   sharing        by labour union outsourcing, skilled labour supply
                                                           and skilled wage and effort
                                                                       determination by skilled worker
In this timing structure profit sharing is assumed to be committed at stage 1 and
at stage 2 conditional on profit sharing, the labour union determines the wage for the
unskilled workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labour and
outsourcing by the firms. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labour
union represents only a small fraction of the total labour force. At stage 3, firms decide
on domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wage of the skilled labour
adjusts to equalize labour demand and labour supply and moreover the representative
skilled worker decides on effort provision. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by
using backward induction.
6III. Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decision,  Employee Effort and
Skilled Wage Formation
III.1.  Labour Demand and Outsourcing
At the last stage, the representative skilled worker decides on the effort e  and
the representative firm decides on the skilled labour demand H , the unskilled labour
demand L , and outsourcing M . The firm decides domestic labour demands and
outsourcing to maximize the profit function
? ?
? ? ? ?MgLwHwMLeHFMax LH
MLH
???? ,,
,,
????                                                     (1)
by taking the skilled worker’s effort, e , the negotiated unskilled and skilled wages, Lw
and Hw ,  as  well  as  profit  sharing, ? , as given. In order to obtain M  units of
outsourced unskilled labour input, we assume that firms also have to spend
? ? 25,0 cMMg ?  with ? ? 0' ?? cMMg  and ? ? 0'' ?? cMg . This increasing marginal
cost of outsourcing captures the idea that there are some other costs associated with
outsourcing as the price for the intermediate goods. Such cost could be communication
cost or cost for quality proofing.
In case of our production function, we partly follow Koskela and Stenbacka
(2007) by assuming a general and reasonable Cobb-Douglas-type production function
with decreasing returns to scale according to three labour inputs, i.e.
? ? ? ? ? ?? ??aa MLeHMLeHF ??? 1,, , where the parameters ?  and a  are  assumed  to
satisfy the assumption: 1;0 ?? a? . From (1) we can derive the marginal products of
skilled labour, unskilled labour and outsourcing: ? ? aaaH MLHaeYF ??? ?? 111??  and
? ?? ? MaaaL FMLaHeYF ???? ?? 11?? , with ? ? ? ? aa MLeHY ??? 1 . The outsourced
unskilled labour input affects the marginal products of the domestic skilled and
unskilled labour inputs as follows:
7? ?? ? 01112 ???? ??? aaaHM MLaHaeYF ??
and
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? 0111 11 ???????
?
???
????? aMLaeHYF
aa
LM ?? ? .
Taking these, we can conclude that for our type of production function the domestic
skilled labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input are complements,
whereas the unskilled domestic labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input
are substitutes in terms of the marginal product effects of outsourcing.8 Also one can
calculate from the production function that the domestic skilled and unskilled labour
are complements, i.e. ? ?? ? 01112 ???? ??? aaaHL MLaHaeYF ?? . Using the marginal
products we can calculate the first-order conditions characterizing the domestic skilled
and unskilled labour demands and outsourcing activities
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 01111 ????? ???? HaaaaaH wMLHaeMLeH ??? (2a)
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 0111 ?????? ??? LaaaaL wMLeHaMLeH ???                            (2b)
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 0111 ?????? ??? cMMLeHaMLeH aaaaM ??? .                        (2c)
These first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the relationship between the skilled
labor ? ?H  and the unskilled labour inclusive of outsourcing ? ?ML ?  as follows
? ?ML
a
a
w
wH
H
L ??? 1
. (3)
8        Ethier (2005) has introduced a partly related production function to analyze the decision between
international outsourcing and in-house production this analysis of the effect of globalization on the
skill premium.
8Using (2b) and (2c) we get the demand for outsourcing as
c
wM L? ,                                                                                  (4)
where 1?
M
wM LwL , and 1??
M
cM c . According to equation (4) higher unskilled
domestic wage rate, and lower outsourcing cost will increase outsourcing.
Substituting the RHS of (3) into (2b) gives the unskilled labour demand, which
can be expressed as follows (see Appendix A)
?
?
??
?
????? ????
c
wewmwMewmwL LHLHL
?????? ,                            (5)
where ? ?? ? 01 1 11 ??? ?? ???? aa aam , 1
1
1 ??
?? ?
?? a  and 0
1
??? ?
?? a , with ? as the own
wage elasticity and ?  as the cross wage elasticity in the absence of outsourcing.
According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the unskilled
labour demand, which show again the substitutability of low skilled labour and
international outsourcing, what is consistent with empirical evidence. As we can see
higher own wage and cross wage and lower high skilled effort will affect negatively the
unskilled labour demand. In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticities of the
unskilled labour, L
M
Lw
L
wL
L ???
?0
 and H
M
Hw
L
wL
H ???
?0
,  and the effort elasticity of
the unskilled labour e
M
e
L
eL ??
?0
 can be written as follows
? ? ? ?
cL
w
L
M
L
M
L
M L
L ?????? ?????????
??
?
? ?? 111                                       (6a)
e
L
H cL
w
L
M ???? ??
?
??
?
? ???
?
??
?
? ?? 11 .                                                                    (6b)
9Of course, in the absence of outsourcing both the wage and effort elasticities are
constant and smaller, i.e. ?? ??0ML  and ??? ?? ?? 00 MeMH .
Using these wage elasticities we find that
? ? ? ? ? ? 01111111 2 ???
??
?
? ????
?
??
?
? ?????
?
??
? ????
?
cL
w
LL
M
LL
MLL
M
LML ????  and
011112 ??
???
?
??
?
? ???
?
??
?
? ????
?
??
? ????
?
McL
w
LL
M
LL
MLL
M
eLMH ?????  so that when
outsourcing will increase, the own wage and cross wage elasticities of the unskilled
labour demand increase. These are also in conformity with empirical evidence. The
effects of outsourcing cost on the own wage and the cross wage elasticity of unskilled
labour are
? ? ? ? ? ? 0111 2 ???
??
?
? ??????
?
??
? ????
?
L
M
cL
M
L
MLLM
c
ccL ???                                     (7a)
? ? 012 ?????
??
?
? ?????
?
??
? ????
?
cL
M
cL
M
L
MLLM
c
eccH
?
????                                       (7b)
so that lower outsourcing cost will increase these wage elasticity of domestic unskilled
labour demand.9
Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship in equation (3)
gives the following labour demand for the representative skilled worker
? ? ? ? ??? eww
a
maH LH
11
1
????
?? ,                                           (8)
where ? ? ? ? 1
1
111 ??
?????? ?
?? a
H
wH HwH , ? ? ? ? 0
1
11 ??
????? ?
?? a
H
wH LwL  and
9       See e.g. Hasan et al. (2007), Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2006), who have provided empirical
evidence according to which international trade have increased the wage elasticity of low-skilled
labour demand.
10
0
1
??? ?
?? a . These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale,
but unlike in the case with unskilled labour, both the own wage and cross wage labor
demand elasticities, and the effort elasticity for the skilled labour are independent of
outsourcing. Like for unskilled demand higher own wage, cross wage and the lower
effort will of course affect negatively the skilled labour demand.
We can now summarize our findings of an asymmetry in how the demands for
skilled and unskilled labour react to the cost of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) the own wage, the cross wage and the effort elasticity for the unskilled
labour demand depend negatively on the cost of outsourcing, and
positively on the amount of outsourcing, whereas
(b) the own wage, the cross wage and the effort elasticity for the skilled
labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing.
III.2.  Wage Formation for Skilled Workers
III.2.1 Optimal Labour Supply and Effort Determination of Skilled Workers
We assume that the market equilibrium for the skilled wage Hw  follows from
the equality of labour demand and the labour supply. The high skilled labour supply is
assumed to be constant, i.e. ??sH .10 Taking this assumption into account we derive
the high skilled wage from market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage Lw  as
given.
The effort determination of the skilled worker is assumed to be determined as
follows:  The effort provision of the skilled worker is associated with a disutility, which
10   A central finding in the empirical labour market literature is that labour supply tends to be quite
unresponsive along the intensive margin. See for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll et al. (2007)
and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). However, this strong assumption is in debt to provide a
relative simple model.
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is assumed to satisfy the function ? ? ?? /1eeh ?  with 10 ?? ?  so that it is convex,
? ? ? ? 0' 1/1 ?? ??eeh ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 01/1'' 2/1 ??? ??? eeh . The individual utility function for the
employed high skilled worker in terms of profit sharing, firm’s profit and disutility of
effort can be written as
? ?eh
H
U ?? ?? ,                                                                       (9)
where ? is profit sharing and ?  the representative firm’s profit. Utility maximization
yields the optimal effort level, where the first-order condition in terms of effort is
? ? 0' ??? eh
H
U ee ?
? . (10)
Using ? ? 0' 1/1 ?? ??eeh  calculating He /?  equation (10) implies (see Appendix B)
? ??? HwKe ? , (11)
where ? ? ? ?? ?????? aa aamK ??? ?? 11 1  and
e
we
e
e HwH?? ?? ?  is the elasticity of the
representative skilled worker’s effort with respect to profit sharing and the skilled
wage. Therefore the optimal effort by the representative skilled worker is influenced
positively by the income parts, 0??
H
w w
ee
H
?  and 0?? ?
?
?
ee , so that both the base
wage and profit sharing enhance the productivity by increasing effort provision and
positively affect labour demand indirectly.11 But outsourcing will have no direct effect
in case of perfect substitutability between outsourcing and domestic unskilled labour.
11        This finding lies in conformity with empirics (see e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson
(1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Kruse (1992) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990)). Also in the
theoretical focus of the literature we find evidence of increasing effort by higher wages, see e.g.
Lin et al. (2002).
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III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for Skilled Wage Formation
Unlike in the case of unskilled workers we assume that the skilled wage Hw  is
determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labor demand
function and the labour supply function. In the case of our constant labour supply,
??sH , the equality sHH ?  gives ? ? ? ? ???? ??
???? eww
a
ma
LH
11
1
, which allows to solve
? ? ?????? ??????? ???????
?
??
? ?? 11
1
1
1
1 ew
ma
aw LH , and by using
? ? ?? ??
??
?
??
? ?? 1
1
1
ma
aX  and ? ??? HwKe ?  we
can rewrite it explicitly as follows
? ? ? ???
??
??
?
? ???
?
?
?
???
?
??
??
? 1111
1
LH Nww (12)
where ? ? ? ? 01111
1
?? ????
?
??
?
??
?
KXN . Knowing this, we can look on comparative statics of
Hw  in terms of Lw :
? ?
? ???
??
?
?
???
? ?????
??
?
?
?
??
???
?
???
?
??
????
? 1111
1
11
1
L
L
H Nw
w
w ,
so that
? ?
? ? 011
1 ???
????
?
L
H
L
H
w
w
w
w
??
? .                                                 (13)
Equation (13) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship
13
between skilled and unskilled wages in the presence of outsourcing.12
Differentiating (12) with respect to profit sharing ?  gives the direct effect on
the high skilled wage
? ? 011 ?????
?
???
??
?
HH ww .                                                    (14)
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the skilled wage
determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 2: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) the skilled wage depends negatively on the unskilled wage and positively
in a direct way on profit sharing, and
(b)  the skilled wage is also directly independent of the cost of outsourcing, but
depends on the unskilled wage, so that higher outsourcing cost will
affected indirectly, whereas
(c) the skilled effort depends positively both on the skilled wage and profit
sharing.
IV. Unskilled Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union under
Committed Profit Sharing
Now we analyze the wage formation of unskilled workers, which takes place in
anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We analyze the
wage formation by the monopoly labor union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p.
401-403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the wage for
12      See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel
(2007a), Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Haskel and Slaughter (2001), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hijzen
(2007), Egger and Egger (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Riley and Young (2007) and
Geishecker and Görg (2008).
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unskilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house unskilled labour demand in the
presence of flexible outsourcing and of market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage
Hw .
13
IV.1.  Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union under Committed Profit
Sharing
The objective function of the labour union of unskilled worker is assumed to be
? ? NbLbwV LLL ??? , where Lb  is the (exogenous) outside option available for the
unskilled workers and N  is the number of labour union members. The monopoly
labour union sets wage for the unskilled workers so as to maximize the surplus
according to
? ? ? NbLbwV LLL
Lw
???max                                                                               (15)
s.t. ?
?
??
?
????? ????
c
wewmwMewmwL LHLHL
??????  and
? ? ???? ????
??? s
LH Hewwa
maH 11
1
, which implies ? ? ? ???
??
??
?
? ???
?
?
?
???
?
??
??
? 1111
1
LH Nww  (see
equation (12)).
The first-order condition associated with (15) is
? ? 0???
?
??
? ???
L
L
LLL
L
Lw dw
dL
L
wbww
w
LV ,                                                            (16)
with
L
H
HLL w
w
w
L
w
L
dw
dL
?
???
???
?? . Plug the labour demand reaction in equation (16), we
13 In Western European countries, which we like to focus, labor market institutions are close to this
(see e.g. Freeman (2008)).
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have ? ? 0??
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
???
?
?
?????
????
????
L
H
H
LH
H
L
L
LLL
L
Lw w
w
w
w
L
w
w
L
L
w
w
Lbww
w
LV . Simplifying this
expression leads to
01 ????
?
???
?
?
????
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
???
?
?
????
H
L
L
H
HLL
H
L
L
H
HLLLw w
w
w
wb
w
w
w
wwV ???? ,                        (17)
where ? ?
)1(1
1
??
?
??
????
?
H
L
L
H
w
w
w
w , the own wage elasticity of unskilled labour demand is
? ?
cL
wL
L ??? ??? 1  and the cross wage elasticity of unskilled labour demand
e
L
H cL
w ??? ??
?
??
?
? ?? 1 . These unskilled labour demand elasticities are not constant
because the unskilled labour demand, ?
?
??
?
??? ??
c
wewmwL LHL
???  depends negatively on
the skilled wage and the unskilled wage but positively on the skilled worker’s effort
and the cost of outsourcing.
Simplifying the first order condition, we get (see Appendix C)
? ?
? ? ? ? LLL
L
LHL bML
MLbebwcw ??
??
?
?? ???
??????
?
???
?
?? 11
1
1
),,,,( , (18)
so that the total wage elasticity also allowing for the relationship between skilled and
unskilled wages is 11 ???
?
??
?
? ??
L
M
L
M
L ?? , where
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ????
????
???
??? ???
?
??
?
???
???
????
??
11
11
1
1
11
1
a
aa ,  outsourcing
c
wM L?  and domestic
unskilled labour demand ?
?
??
?
??? ??
c
wewmwL LHL
??? . It is important to emphasize that the
optimal unskilled wage (18) even in the case of the monopoly labour union is an
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implicit form in the presence of outsourcing, because the mark-up
? ?
? ? ? ? 111
1 ????
???
ML
MLA ??
??  depends on the unskilled wage rate in a non-linear way so
that it cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic unskilled wage. In the
absence of outsourcing the mark-up is constant, i.e. ? ?10 ??? ?
?
MA .
In order to answering our research question and characterizing the effect of
outsourcing cost on the unskilled wage formation we therefore apply the implicit
differentiation. Differentiating the wage formation (18) with respect to the unskilled
wage and the outsourcing cost gives
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? dcb
ccdwb
ww
L
L
L
L
L
L
LL
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
22 1
1
1
1
1
?
??
?
??
?
?
???
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
???
??
?
??????
,
which can be expressed as ? ? ? ? ??
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(see Appendix D) the relationship between the unskilled wage formation and
outsourcing  cost can be written as follows
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dc
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?
,                                              (20)
so that lower (higher) outsourcing cost will decrease (increase) the wage of unskilled
domestic workers.
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (18) with respect to the profit
sharing and the unskilled wage gives
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so that profit sharing for skilled workers will have an positive effect on the domestic
unskilled wage.
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Knowing this, we are able to find an answer to our main question: How does the
implementation of profit sharing for high skilled workers influence outsourcing
activities? Differentiating (4) in terms of profit sharing gives
01 ?? ?? d
dw
cd
dM L                                                                    (22)
so that the effect of outsourcing activities is driven by the effect on low skilled wage,
which is positive.
We can now summarize our findings which answering: How does the
implementation of profit sharing for skilled workers in the presence of outsourcing
affect the low skilled workers’ wage and outsourcing?
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker have a positive effect on the
wage for the unskilled labor and
(b) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker have an enhancing effect on
outsourcing, whereas
(c) lower cost of outsourcing will decrease the wage for the unskilled labour.
However, up to now we are only analyzing the direct effect of profit sharing and
outsourcing cost on the wage for high skilled worker. Using the above results we can
show the overall effects of outsourcing cost and implementing profit sharing for the
high skilled wage. Using equations (20), and (21) jointly with equations (13) and (14)
these overall effects can be expressed as
? ??
???
???
??
?
??? ???
??? d
dw
w
ww
d
dw L
L
HHH and
? ?
0???
??
??
dc
dw
w
w
dc
dw L
L
HH .
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Following from this, lower cost of outsourcing will raise the domestic skilled wage and
decrease the unskilled wage and thus leads to higher wage gap.
Inline with earlier research on homogenous labour force and empirical studies,
we also find an ambiguous effect of profit sharing on the domestic skilled wage, so that
profit sharing could have a supplementary or complementary character for the base
wage.14
We can summarize our findings in
Proposition 4: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) lower cost of outsourcing, by decreasing the wage for the unskilled
labour and increasing the wage for the skilled labour, will inducing higher
wage dispersion, whereas
(b) higher profit sharing for the skilled worker can have a supplementary or
compensatory character for the skilled labour.
V.       Conclusion
In this paper we tried to describe a more realistic framework of flexible
outsourcing in a partly unionized dual labour market. In western European countries we
often observe that unlike low skilled workers, which are organized in trade union, high
skilled wages are mostly determined competitively. However, high skilled worker
could in opposite to the low skilled labour force directly participate on firm’s success
via profit sharing. But this will affected the wage determination of both types of labour
and affet the outsourcing demand. Thereby we answer the following questions: First,
how does the implementation of profit sharing for high skilled workers influence
14  For theoretical analysis in the case of homogeneous labour see Koskela and König (2008b). There
is also some empirical evidence for both properties. Black and Lynch (2004) show by using U.S.
data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, which implies a compensatory
character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by using UK data and also in Kraft and Ugarkovic
(2005) by using German panel data, it has been shown that introducing profit sharing does not
reduce the wage, which implies a supplementary character. See also the book by Ugarkovic
(2008).
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outsourcing activities? Second, how do the opportunity of flexible outsourcing and its
cost influence the wage for both types of workers and profit sharing? And third, what is
the relationship between profit sharing and wage levels?
In the above analyses we could show that the wage of the high skilled workers
will be negatively affected by the wage of the low skilled. The overall effect of
implementing committed profit sharing effect on high skilled wage is ambiguous, since
on one side there is a wage increasing direct effect, such that profit sharing has a
supplementary character, but on the other side there is a negative indirect effect via the
wage for the low skilled worker. We also show that lower outsourcing cost leads to
falling wages for the low skilled. However, the high skilled wage does not directly
depend on outsourcing cost. Also here there is only an indirect effect via low skilled
wage working. Our analysis shows that lower outsourcing cost will at the same time
decrease the low skilled wage and increase the high skilled wage and thus raise the
wage dispersion. Also we could conclude that the effect of profit sharing on
outsourcing activities is indirect via the effect on low skilled wage and ambiguous. This
follows since outsourcing demand is only affected by the relation of low skilled worker
wage and outsourcing cost, where profit sharing affected the low skilled wage. As
analyzed in the literature also a flexible profit sharing system could be implemented.
Since here the profit share and the wage for high skilled worker would decided after the
wage negotiation for the low skilled, there is no effect of implementing such a system
on low skilled wage and thus on outsourcing demand. However, similar to the
argumentation of Koskela and König (2008b) it can shown that in the presence of
outsourcing such a profit sharing system provides a lower profit share as in the absence
of outsourcing.
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Appendix A: Optimal Unskilled Labour Demand
Substituting the RHS of (3) for H  into (2b) gives
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which is equivalent to
? ? ? ? La
aa
H
L we
a
aa
w
wML 11
1
1 ?? ??
?
??
?
?
???
?
?
?
???
?? ??
??
?  .                                                           (A3)
Simplifying (A3)  with ? ?? ? 01 1 11 ??? ?? ???? aa aam , 1
1
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?? a  and 0
1
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?? a ,
give (5). QED.
Appendix B: Optimal Skilled Employee Effort
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The first-order condition in terms of effort determination from (9) is
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Using equation (8) ? ? ? ? ??? eww
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first-order condition ? ? 0' ??? eg
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where ? ? ? ?? ? 1111 ?????? ???? aa , ? ?? ? ? ? 0111 ?????? ???? aa  and
? ?? ? ? ?? ? 11111 ???????? ?????? aa . By substituting these into (B2) gives equation
(11). QED.
Appendix C: Optimal Unskilled Wage Setting
The first-order condition associated with ? ? ?LbwV LL
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??max  s.t. 0?L?  and ??H
can be written as follows
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where the own wage elasticity of labour demand is ? ?
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?????? * . The market equilibrium for
the skilled labour is
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which can be expressed as equation (12) so that
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Appendix D: Effects on Low Skilled Wage
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QED.
